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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
Newport Associates Development Company and Newport 
Marine Holding, Inc. ("Newport") appeal the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of The Travelers 
Indemnity Company of Illinois ("Travelers").1 The District 
Court held that the insurance policy issued by Travelers to 
Newport unambiguously did not cover a breakwater owned 




Newport is a subsidiary of the LeFrak Organization, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court granted Travelers' summary judgment motion in an 
order dated March 22, 1995. Claims against Frenkel & Co., Newport's 
broker, remained pending at that time. Those claims were later settled, 
and upon motion of Frenkel and Newport, the court entered an order 
finalizing its March 22, 1995 order. We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 1332 following this action's removal from New Jersey state 
court. 
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which has been involved for several years in the 
development of the Jersey City waterfront. This 
development includes the Newport Marina ("the marina"), 
managed by another LeFrak Organization subsidiary, Mid- 
State Management Corporation. The marina contains 
various buildings, docks, berths for boats, and a 
breakwater. The breakwater is located about 120 feet from 
the dock's end and is designed to limit wave action in the 
area in which the boats are moored. 
 
In early 1990, Mid-State Management Corporation hired 
an independent insurance broker, Frenkel & Co., Inc. 
("Frenkel"), to procure an insurance policy for the marina. 
Michael Feinstein of Frenkel met several times with 
Newport employee Arthur Klein to discuss the scope of 
coverage under the proposed policy. Feinstein also visited 
the marina on April 9, 1990 and took photographs of the 
site. Ultimately, Feinstein drafted a policy containing, in 
part, the following language: 
 
       Buildings and Structures: [for the amount of] $600,000 
 
       Concrete Pier, under buildings [and structures]: [for 
       the amount of] $1,750,000 
 
       Slips, consisting of metal slips, walkways, ramps, 
       pilings, power cables and other integral parts 
       collectively called "slips": [for the amount of] 
       $2,000,000. 
 
       Business Interruption: [for the amount of] $300,000 
 
       all as defined in forms attached hereto and located as 
       indicated or subsequently reported to and agreed to by 
       The Travelers. In no event shall liability exceed any 
       specific sublimit shown in this policy for any insured 
       loss, coverage or location(s). 
 
In his deposition, Feinstein stated he always intended to 
cover "everything in the water" under the insurance policy 
and he believed the phrase "and other integral parts" would 
include a breakwater. However, Feinstein acknowledges he 
was not aware of the existence of the breakwater at the 
time he drafted the policy. Nor could Arthur Klein recall 
whether he specifically instructed Feinstein to include the 
breakwater. 
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Feinstein submitted his draft of the policy to Travelers 
and another insurer, Chubb Insurance Company. Feinstein 
also submitted photographs of the marina, taken on April 
9, 1990, as well as a map that described the marina and 
showed the breakwater. Travelers issued an insurance 
policy incorporating verbatim Feinstein's description of the 
slips, but the policy did not incorporate the map or 
photographs. Newport purchased the policy from Travelers 
to provide coverage for the marina from February 1, 1992 
to February 1, 1993. 
 
In December 1992, the breakwater was severely damaged 
by a storm. Newport submitted a claim for damages under 
the policy. Travelers denied the claim, stating that the slips 
insured did not include the breakwater, and Newportfiled 
suit for breach of contract. The District Court found that 
the policy unambiguously did not cover the breakwater and 





On appeal from the grant of summary judgment, we 
review the evidence de novo and in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party. See Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 
1294-95 (3d Cir. 1996). We apply the same test as the 
district court: that is, we determine "whether there is a 
genuine issue of material fact and, if not, whether the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. 
at 1295. We will affirm a grant of summary judgment in a 
breach of contract action only where the contract is 
unambiguous and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. See Tamarind Resort Assocs. v. 
Government of Virgin Islands, 138 F.3d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 
1998). There is no dispute that New Jersey insurance and 
contract law governs in this case. 
 
Under New Jersey law, the words of an insurance 
contract should be given their everyday and common 
meaning. See Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co., 582 A.2d 1257, 
1260 ( N.J. 1990) ("[T]he words of an insurance policy 
should be given their ordinary meaning, and in the absence 
of an ambiguity, a court should not engage in a strained 
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construction to support the imposition of liability."). The 
test for ambiguity is whether the policy's phrasing is "so 
confusing that the average policyholder cannot make out 
the boundaries of coverage." Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 
405 A.2d 788, 795 (N.J. 1979). Whether the contract terms 
are clear or ambiguous is a question of law. See Sumitomo 
Mach. Corp. v. Alliedsignal, Inc., 81 F.3d 328, 332 (3d Cir. 
1996) (applying New Jersey law); Nester v. O'Donnell, 693 
A.2d 1214, 1220 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997). 
 
In determining whether a contract is ambiguous, a court 
"must `consider the words of the agreement, alternative 
meanings suggested by counsel, and extrinsic evidence 
offered in support of those meanings.' " Pennbarr Corp. v. 
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 976 F.2d 145, 151 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(applying New Jersey law) (quoting International Union, UAW 
v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 917 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1990)). If 
the nonmoving party presents a reasonable alternative 
reading of the contract, then a question of fact as to the 
meaning of the contract exists which can only be resolved 
at trial. See Tigg Corp. v. Dow Corning Corp., 822 F.2d 358, 
361 (3d Cir. 1987); Landtect Corp. v. State Mut. Life 
Assurance Co., 605 F.2d 75, 80 (3d Cir. 1979). Thus, the 
dispositive question is whether Newport provided a 
reasonable reading of the contract, raising a question of 
fact as to the meaning of the contract and requiring 
resolution at trial. 
 
The insurance policy in this case covers, inter alia, 
"[s]lips, consisting of metal slips, walkways, ramps, pilings, 
power cables and other integral parts collectively called 
`slips.' " The parties dispute whether the breakwater falls 
within this provision. Travelers argues that the paragraph 
applies only to slips and their physically attached, 
component parts. Newport urges that the phrase "other 
integral parts" covers the breakwater because a breakwater 
is functionally necessary to the operation of the slips. 
 
The District Court held that the policy language 
unambiguously does not cover the breakwater. The court 
reasoned: 
 
       All objective indicia demonstrate that this text is 
       unambiguous and must be construed as Travelers 
       argues. 
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        (1.) A breakwater is not a slip or berth for a vessel. 
 
        (2.) In the specific definition of "slips" in the policy, 
       all specifically listed components of that term which 
       immediately precede the phrase "and other integral 
       parts" are (by description and reasonable construction 
       at least) physically attached to the structures in which 
       the boats are berthed. Accordingly, it is reasonable to 
       construe the phrase "and other integral parts" as being 
       consistent in nature with its specific antecedents. The 
       unattached breakwater, forty yards out into the 
       Hudson River, serving a function very different from 
       the slips (or "slips"), could not under any reasonable 
       expectation of the parties at the time of contracting be 
       included as an "other integral part" covered by the 
       insurance policy. 
 
        (3.) Dictionary definitions of "integral parts" connote 
       component "parts which together constitute a whole." 
       The Random House Dictionary (unabridged ed. 1967). 
       The excerpt from the Random House Pocket Dictionary 
       which Feinstein consulted is not inconsistent. A 
       breakwater is not such a part of the structure where 
       vessels are berthed. 
 
Newport Assocs. Dev. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 94- 
1514, slip op. at 11 (D.N.J. Mar. 21, 1995). Therefore, the 
District Court concluded, "The only reasonable construction 
of the terminology is that the breakwater lying offshore 
from the vessel berthing structure was not an `integral part' 
thereof and hence covered as part of the `slips' as defined 
in that policy." Id. at 12. 
 
We agree with this construction of the language. As the 
New Jersey Supreme Court has made clear, words in an 
insurance contract should be given their everyday meaning. 
See Longobardi, 582 A.2d at 1260. Here, the policy 
language refers to "slips" and "other integral parts" of slips, 
such as "walkways," "ramps," "pilings," and "power cables." 
These parts are all physically attached components of the 
slips themselves, whereas the breakwater is an entirely 
separate structure located 120 feet from the end of the 
dock in the Hudson River. Common sense suggests that the 
term "other integral parts" was meant to refer not to the 
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breakwater, but to the various component parts of the slips 
that could not be exhaustively identified by name. We 
believe this interpretation is the only one consistent with 
the provision's references to "slips, walkways, ramps, 
pilings, [and] power cables." 
 
Newport cites Zanfagna v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 415 
A.2d 1049 (R.I. 1980) for the proposition that an item need 
not be physically attached to the insured property to be 
considered an "integral part." In Zanfagna, the disputed 
items were "electrical fixtures, appliances and interior doors 
that at the time of the theft were being temporarily stored 
in a garage while awaiting incorporation within the main 
structure." 415 A.2d at 1051. Thus, the items in question 
were physical components that simply had not yet been 
incorporated. In this case, however, the breakwater was an 
entirely separate structure that was never to be integrated 
into the insured property. 
 
Newport also argues the policy language must be 
construed in light of extrinsic evidence purportedly showing 
that the parties intended the breakwater to be covered. We 
agree that extrinsic evidence is relevant to determining 
whether ambiguity exists. See, e.g., American Cyanamid Co. 
v. Fermenta Animal Health Co., 54 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 
1995). However, "the focus must remain on the language 
chosen by the parties, and a text unambiguous when 
accorded the commonly understood meaning of its words 
cannot be disregarded unless the extrinsic evidence is such 
as might cause a reasonable fact finder to understand the 
text differently." Id. at 182. 
 
Newport cites as extrinsic evidence of coverage the 
photographs sent to Travelers which depict, in the 
background of some photographs, parts of the breakwater 
(as well as a diagram depicting but not labeling the 
breakwater) and the statement of Mr. Feinstein that he 
"intended" to cover everything in the water. This evidence is 
weak at best. The map and photographs were not 
incorporated into the policy. The mere presence of an item 
in a map or photograph that the insurer saw is not enough 
to place it within the realm of coverage when there is no 
textual support for coverage in the policy itself. 
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Similarly, Mr. Feinstein's statement that he intended the 
policy to cover "everything in the water" is unpersuasive. As 
the District Court noted, this statement was made only 
after litigation ensued. Indeed, "Feinstein did not know 
about the breakwater at the time he drafted the policy 
language and there is no evidence that he discussed it with 
anyone from Newport at that time." Newport, slip op. at 12. 
Moreover, it is "undisputed that the inclusion of the 
breakwater in the policy language was not expressed to 
Travelers either orally or in writing." Id.  If the parties had 
intended the breakwater to be included, they could have 
used the unambiguous term "breakwater" in the policy. 
They did not do so. 
 
Far from causing a reasonable fact finder to "understand 
the text differently," American Cyanamid, 54 F.3d at 182, 
the extrinsic evidence fully supports the District Court's 
construction of the policy. Consequently, we agree with the 
District Court that the policy unambiguously excluded the 




Newport also invokes the doctrines of "reasonable 
expectations" and "contra preferentum" in its argument for 
reversal. We believe those doctrines are inapplicable here. 
The doctrine of reasonable expectations states that an 
insurance contract generally is to be construed "so as to 
fulfill the reasonable expectations of the insured." Werner 
Indus., Inc. v. First State Ins. Co., 548 A.2d 188, 191 (N.J. 
1988); see also Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 406, 
412 (N.J. 1985) (same). As a result, where language in an 
insurance contract is ambiguous, courts usually will 
construe the language in favor of the insured. See, e.g., 
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pipher, 140 F.3d 222, 227 
(3d Cir. 1998) (noting that ambiguous terms "should be 
construed against [insurer] so as to provide coverage to its 
insured"); Doto v. Russo, 659 A.2d 1371, 1376 (N.J. 1995) 
("New Jersey courts often have construed ambiguous 
language in insurance policies in favor of the insured and 
against the insurer."); Mazzilli v. Accident & Casualty Ins. 
Co., 170 A.2d 800, 803 (N.J. 1961) ("If the controlling 
language of the policy will support two meanings, one 
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favorable to the insurer, and the other favorable to the 
insured, the interpretation sustaining coverage must be 
applied."). 
 
As discussed supra, the policy language in this case was 
unambiguous. Accordingly, we do not find it necessary to 
inquire whether Newport reasonably expected that the 
breakwater was covered by the policy. But we note that 
with the exception of an after-the-fact statement by Mr. 
Feinstein, who was not even aware of the breakwater's 
existence when he drafted the policy, there is no evidence 
that anyone believed the breakwater was covered by the 
policy. The policy of liberally construing insurance 
contracts cannot override the plain language of the text and 
the absence of extrinsic evidence supporting Newport's 
position. As the New Jersey Supreme Court has held, 
"[a]lthough Courts should construe insurance policies in 
favor of the insured, they should not write for the insured 
a better policy of insurance than the one purchased." 
Longobardi, 582 A.2d at 1260 (quoting Walker Rogge, Inc. v. 
Chelsea Title & Guar. Co., 562 A.2d 208, 214 (N.J. 1989)). 
 
Newport also relies on the doctrine of "contra 
preferentum," which states that "as between two reasonable 
and practical constructions of an ambiguous contractual 
provision . . . the provision should be construed less 
favorably to that party which selected the contractual 
language." United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 216 
(1970). According to Newport, the insurance policy should 
be construed against Travelers because Travelers selected 
the policy language and "Frenkel [Feinstein's company] 
acted as, if anything, Traveler's broker." (Appellant's Reply 
Br. at 3.) But this contention is belied by Newport's own 
statement describing Frenkel's role as a middleman: "As an 
insurance broker, Frenkel was `one who act[ed] as a 
middleman between the insured and the insurer, and who 
solicit[ed] insurance from the public under no employment' 
from any specific insurance company." (Appellant's Br. at 
4-5 (quoting Boulton Agency, Inc. v. Phoenix Worldwide 
Indus. Inc., 698 So.2d 1248, 1250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1997)). 
 
In fact, Feinstein met with Newport's employee Klein 
several times to discuss the scope of insurance coverage to 
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be purchased, and Feinstein acted at Klein's direction while 
drafting the policy. The District Court found that Feinstein 
was not the agent of Travelers, but of Newport:"Newport 
had its broker [Feinstein] draft and describe the items to be 
included under the Travelers' policy. This broker 
represented his client, Newport." Newport, slip op. at 8 
(citation omitted). 
 
Regardless of whether Feinstein's role is better 
characterized as a middleman or as Newport's agent, the 
crucial fact is that Travelers did not unilaterally impose the 
policy on Newport. As we recently observed in a case 
applying New Jersey insurance law, the doctrine of contra 
preferentum is based on the fact that "insurance contracts 
are in most instances `nonnegotiable' " since they tend to be 
drafted solely by the insurance industry. Pittston Co. v. 
Allianz Ins. Co., 124 F.3d 508, 521 (3d Cir. 1997). When a 
contract is drafted by the insured or jointly negotiated, the 
doctrine does not apply: 
 
       [T]he dispositive question is not whether the insured is 
       a sophisticated corporate entity, but rather whether the 
       insurance contract is negotiated, jointly drafted or 
       drafted by the insured. In such instances, we conclude 
       that the doctrine of contra preferentum should not be 
       invoked to inure to the benefit of the insured. 
 
Id. Here, the insurance policy was drafted by an 
independent broker who was hired by Newport and acted in 
consultation with Newport employees. The drafted policy 
was then shopped to at least two different insurance 
companies. Newport selected Travelers after reviewing its 
proposed policy, and Travelers adopted the broker's policy 
language without any changes to the provisions at issue. 
Under these circumstances, we believe the contract was 
either drafted by Newport or jointly drafted, and the 





Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
 
                                10 
  
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                11 
